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COMPASSION, HATRED, AND FREE EXPRESSION
Ronald J. Rychlak*
I. INTRODucrION
I am deeply honored to be invited to present the 2007 Judge William
C. Keady Distinguished Lecture to the Mississippi Humanities Council. It
was my great pleasure to meet Judge Keady when I first moved to Missis-
sippi. I still remember the intimate lunch that I shared with him and an-
other law professor. Later, I spent several years as executive director of
the William C. Keady American Inn of Court. Aside from our chapter
being named for him, this organization and its values - civility and profes-
sionalism in the practice of law - were near to his heart. In fact, he estab-
lished our inn, the third oldest in the nation.
In deciding on a topic, I wanted to select one that reflected Judge
Keady's interests. He wrote opinions on all sorts of legal issues,1 including
some important environmental law cases,2 but he is probably best
remembered today for the important role that he played in the civil rights
struggle during the 1960s and 1970s. One cannot diminish the role that he
and other federal judges played in those turbulent years.
Looking at the cases that he decided during this era, I was struck by
the number of times "civil rights" cases boiled down to issues of free ex-
pression: whether protesters were permitted to march;3 whether employers
were retaliating against political activists;4 whether state college adminis-
trators could bar certain speakers,5 and so on.6 Of course, as others have
* MDLA Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. Prof. Rychlak is a
member of the Mississippi Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission; on the Board of
Advisors for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights; an advisor to the Holy See's
delegation to the United Nations; on the Advisory Board of The International Solidarity and Human
Rights Institute; the former chair of the Board of Directors of Red Cross of North Central Mississippi;
and a member and former Executive Director of the William C. Keady American Inn of Court III.
1. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 554 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Miss. 1981);
Sierra Club v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Boone v. Tillatoba Creek Drainage Dist.,
379 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
2. Id.
3. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., v. Shelton, 327 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (school
board sought to prohibit black students and parents from protesting); Robinson v. Stovall, 473 F. Supp.
135 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (constitutionality of the Okolona, Mississippi parade ordinance) afTd in part,
rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Miss. 1968)
(reviewing the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance in Holly Springs, Mississippi, requiring that
one hour's notice be given to the City Police Department before any protest march).
4. Jordan v. Cagle, 474 F. Supp. 1198 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (employment dispute involving political
activity and claim of retaliatory discharge).
5. Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (a challenge to the rules and regulations
relating to off-campus speakers on college and university campuses in Mississippi); Stacy v. Williams,
312 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (Temporary Restraining Order memorandum in same case).
6. AFL-CIO v. City of Tupelo, 439 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (right of association and
expression in labor unions); Machesky v. Bizzell, 288 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (suit seeking to
enjoin protests and boycott of businesses in Greenwood, Mississippi and Leflore County, Mississippi
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noted, the Free Speech Movement of the 1960s "was about civil rights." 7
This all came together recently when I was at Western State University
College of Law in Los Angeles, and I saw a poster featuring a photograph
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. waving to the crowds in Washington D.C.
The caption said: "The Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of speech. Oth-
erwise, it might all have been a dream."8
The right to free speech stands behind so many of our other rights, yet
today we see it threatened on a global scale with incidents like the riots
following publication of the Danish cartoons, 9 criminal sanctions for Holo-
caust deniers in Europe,10 and Internet restrictions based on content of the
speech.11 Free speech is also central to national debates over hate crime
legislation, campus speech codes, and campaign finance reform. If we are
going to protect our civil rights, we must protect the right to free expres-
sion, and if we are going to protect it, we have to understand it.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION
Too often, Americans are confused about the First Amendment right
to free speech. They think it means we have the right to use insulting and
vulgar language and say whatever we want with no consequences. Such a
definition not only misconstrues the right, it diminishes it to the point of
triviality. 2 The right to free speech in our Constitution means that the gov-
ernment is not supposed to unreasonably interfere with what we say.' 3 It
does not provide us with immunity for all of our words, and it does not
restrict employers or other private actors.
To take one recent example, many commentators and media personnel
complained that when radio personality Don Imus was taken off the air for
because of alleged denial of equal rights) rev'd, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). The plaintiffs in one of
Judge Keady's cases involving restrictions on male teachers' facial hair also advanced claims regarding
expression, but I'll leave that argument to the litigants! See Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D.
Miss. 1972).
7. Dale Vree, The Filthy Speech Movement, NEW OXFORD REVIEW, September 2007 at 21.
8. The poster was produced by the American Bar Association
9. See Editorial, Those Danish Cartoons, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006; see also Richard
John Neuhaus, What the Pope Gets Right. . ., TIME, Nov. 19, 2006 (discussing the riots that took place
following the Pope's comments at Regensberg University); Richard John Neuhaus, The Regensburg
Moment, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2006 (same).
10. BBC News, Holocaust Denier Irving is Jailed, Feb. 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
europe/4733820.stm (after pleading guilty to having said, in 1989, that there were no gas chambers at
Aushwitz, Irving was sentenced, in 2006, to three years imprisonment).
11. See infra pp. 19-20.
12. Dale Vree, The Filthy Speech Movement, NEW OXFORD REVIEW, September 2007 at 21-22
("[T]he Free Speech Movement in Berkeley in 1964... was about civil rights. In its wake, the Filthy
Speech Movement was devised as a mockery by beatniks and bohemians .... The Free Speech Move-
ment didn't want to have anything to do with them ... ").
13. Freedom of speech is not absolute in the United States. Federal, state, and local govern-
ments may limit speech if they have a compelling interest and if they use the least restrictive means to
do so. In fact, categories of "low value" speech such as obscenity, defamation, and "fighting words" are
often excluded from First Amendment protection. Furthermore, communications media enjoy lesser
constitutional protection than speech communicated in print media. As such, the government can law-
fully regulate hate speech on the Internet if it is threatening, harassing, or if it incites the listener to
illegal action.
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making a vulgar reference to players on the Rutgers women's basketball
team, it violated his First Amendment rights.14 It didn't. There was no
governmental interference in that situation.15 An employer made a busi-
ness decision. That happens every day. 6 Words, like actions and ideas,
have consequences that are often felt in the marketplace.
Similarly, groups like the NAACP recently have been holding funerals
and burial ceremonies for the "N-word." 17 These events usually involve no
governmental interference with speech. Elimination of vile and vulgar lan-
guage is a good thing when the speaker is the one who makes the decision
not to employ it. There is nothing wrong with encouraging them to do
that. 8 Our level of concern must be heightened, however, when govern-
mental officials take similar actions.' 9
The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution,20 does
not actually grant rights to American citizens. It assumes that the rights
14. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, How the Firing of Don imus Undermined First Amendment Values:
An Analogy to Secondary Boycotts, FindLaw.com., Apr. 23, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20070423.html (discussing both sides of this debate); Frank Salvato, You Either Abide by the First
Amendment or You Don't, American Chronicle, April 12, 2007, http://www.americanchronicle.com/arti-
cles/viewArticle.asp?articlelD=24230.
15. Dorf, supra note 14.
16. A more serious threat to the First Amendment took place with a different radio personality,
Michael Savage. In response to a week-long fast embarked upon by 35 students and illegal aliens,
Savage said: "I would say, let them fast until they starve to death, then that solves the problem." Ge-
rardo Sandoval, a supervisor for the city of San Francisco responded by saying: "The intolerant and
racist comments of Michael Savage demand a strong condemnation." He then introduced a resolution
in which he condemned Savage for "defamatory language... against immigrants" and called Savage's
comments "symbolic of racism and hatred." Sandoval pushed for a unanimous endorsement of his
resolution, required for it to be approved by the San Francisco board. The vote in favor was 9-1, mean-
ing that it was not approved. Supervisor Ed Jew, whose grandfather emigrated from China, turned in
the veto vote, after affirming Savage's First Amendment right to express his opinion. Worldnet Daily,
San Francisco fails in attack on Savage, August 14, 2007, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/arti-
cle.asp?ARTICLEID=57170. When asked about his vote, Jew said: "as an elected official I swore to
defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the First Amendment. That's exactly what
I was doing. .. Theirs was a vote against Michael Savage's rights enshrined in the First Amendment."
Judi McLeod, San Francisco Supervisor who voted to preserve Michael Savage's Right to Free Speech
continues to be harassed, CANADA FREE PRESS, September 4, 2007. Later, Jew was voted off of the
council, and the motion to condemn Savage was approved. See World Net Daily, San Francisco supervi-
sors condemn Savage Officials pass resolution against talker for 'hate speech', October 2, 2007, http://
www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=57947.
17. See Fr. Jerome LeDoux, Reflections on Life: NAACP buries 'N-word,' all that goes with It,
MississiPPi CATHOLIC, September 14, 2007, at 8.
18. See id. (discussing comedian Richard Pryor's decision not to use the N-word). Bill Cosby
discussed the campaign against the word on Meet the Press, October 14, 2007. So far, it has had mixed
results. While one who writes an academic paper or reports a news story is reluctant to use it even
while discussing the controversy over its use, it is used all too frequently by African-American artists,
athletes, and youth who model the urban gangster lifestyle. I remember as a young boy reading Bob
Gibson's autobiography in which he spoke of how the term hurt him, even when used by black come-
dian Dick Gregory. Gibson, a Hall of Fame pitcher with the St. Louis Cardinals was a hero to me. Had
I ever been tempted to use this word, which was never uttered by my parents or any of their friends in
my presence, Gibson's words alone would have prevented me from doing so.
19. LeDoux, supra note 17, at 8.
20. Because the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are worded differently, commentators will some-
times refer to the first eight amendments as constituting the true Bill of Rights.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
exist, and. it restricts the government from interfering with them.2 ' In a
literal sense, however, the Bill of Rights is not a list of rights but a list of
restrictions on governmental power.22
When I teach Constitutional Law or Criminal Procedure at the Uni-
versity of Mississippi, I do a lecture on the Bill of Rights. Sometimes I
even take a framed copy of that document to class. My talk begins by
discussing colonial days. In those days, there was no national "American"
identity. Most colonists looked upon their colony as their county.23 To the
extent there was something bigger than the colony, it was England. Of
course, a great deal of resentment toward England developed even prior to
the Revolutionary War. As British authorities cracked down on the colo-
nists immediately before and during the war, the resentment grew.
After the colonies won their independence, it became clear that they
needed to form some type of union to facilitate trade and for self-defense.
The Constitution was designed to do that, but as drafted it did not contain a
Bill of Rights. When the Constitution was sent to the states for ratification,
however, it became clear that the document would not be ratified unless
the people were assured that this new federal government would be re-
stricted from interfering with their rights, including the right to free speech.
Colonists who had just thrown off King George were worried about
creating a new, powerful central authority that might treat them the same
way that England had done. They were not prepared to accept a constitu-
tion unless it protected their rights. So they reached an agreement. The
Constitution was ratified as written, but the first Congress added a Bill of
Rights to prohibit the federal government from infringing upon citizens'
rights.
This is where, in my Criminal Procedure class, I run down the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment relates to Free Speech, Press, Assembly,
Religion, and the Right to petition the government. Of course, the British
had denied all of these rights to colonists at different times. The Second
Amendment provides for the right to keep and bear arms. The British had
taken guns away from the colonists as the Revolutionary War approached.
The Third Amendment relates to quartering soldiers in the homes of citi-
zens. The British did that too. In fact, you can go right on down the entire
Bill of Rights and see that this document was designed to assure citizens of
the young nation that the new central government would be very limited
and would not do the same kind of things that the British had done.
21. The French took the opposite view of rights. In their Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen of 1789, the rights of the community took precedence over the rights of individuals. Rights-to
speech, religion, and press-are circumscribed by the effects they might have on the public order.
Whereas the American Bill of Rights protects the individual against the group, the French Declaration
of Rights protects the group against potentially disruptive individuals.
22. In fact, as written, the restrictions apply only to the federal government. The 14th Amend-
ment, enacted following the Civil War, makes most of the limitations applicable to the states.
23. See generally Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues, and Social Costs: A Historical Exami-
nation of State Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 24 (1992).
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After the Civil War, the Constitution was further amended to make
sure that state governments did not violate the rights of their citizens. The
important realization, however, is that the right to free expression as con-
templated in our constitutional scheme is simply a right to be free from
unreasonable governmental interference, not the right to say whatever you
want with no consequences. Still, this is an enormously important right.
III. CAMPUS SPEECH CODES
I first developed a professional interest in the subject of free speech in
the late 1980s, when I learned of the various efforts to establish "speech
codes" or "free-speech zones" on college campuses. At the University of
Mississippi, the raging debate centered on display of the Confederate battle
flag. It was widely viewed as a symbol of Ole Miss, but it made many peo-
ple feel uncomfortable, and it seemed to be hurting the university's na-
tional reputation.24 Any regulation of the right to display the flag,
however, would have to survive a constitutional challenge. A flat prohibi-
tion would have had serious constitutional problems. Many conversations
focused on how to keep people from waving the Confederate flag without
offending the First Amendment.
Talking this over with my colleagues, I proposed an answer that
seemed to work. We would simply ban all flags from sporting events. They
obstructed the spectators' views and posed a potential hazard. The stadium
already banned umbrellas; flags were similar. This ban might survive a
First Amendment challenge because it regulated conduct, not speech; all
flags were treated equally; and there was a rational basis for this
restriction.25
We went so far as to draft a motion for the faculty senate and revise it
at least once. We circulated it to several colleagues to get their thoughts
and suggestions. We prepared a cover letter to send to every member of
the faculty senate. We thought we had found a proper way in which to ban
Confederate flags from sporting events, and we thought that there would
be sufficient faculty support for it to pass.26
As we were preparing for our presentation to the faculty senate, a col-
league to whom we had circulated our proposal came to us and said,
"you're restricting free speech." I explained that we were really restricting
conduct, not speech, and since we were not singling out a specific flag, we
24. See id.
25. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 484, 516 (noting the uncertainty of any university rule bearing on matters of race and free speech).
26. At the meeting at which we had contemplated submitting this proposal, the faculty senate
approved a resolution calling for an end to segregated fraternities and sororities (with the sanction
being loss of lease) with only one dissenting vote. See Allison Wilkins, Greeks Believe Integration Posi-
tive, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN, Aug. 22, 1991, at 6A (reflecting mixed student reaction). Later, both the
alumni association at the University of Mississippi and the faculty senate passed resolutions requesting
that fans voluntarily stop waving the Confederate flag at University sporting events. Cf. W. Sterling
Wright, A Few Passing Thoughts on the Issue of Flags, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN, Aug. 22, 1991, at 3A
(Letters to the Editor) (cautioning supporters of the Confederate flag that these requests are a precur-
sor to a rule prohibiting display of the Confederate flag). Eventually, the university did ban all flags.
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needed only to show a rational basis to avoid violating the First Amend-
ment. This regulation, I argued, was clearly constitutional. "Perhaps," he
responded, "but you're still restricting free speech."27
That accusation recast the entire issue in my mind. He did not accuse
us of violating the First Amendment; he said free speech. To the extent that
we had considered the free speech issue, we had seen only the limitations
imposed by the First Amendment. Those limitations were obstacles that a
creative lawyer could navigate. Our plan had been designed in contempla-
tion of those obstacles, and we thought we had a way around them. The
charge being leveled at us now, however, changed things. No longer was it
a simple matter of getting around the First Amendment. Now we had to
address the issue at the heart of the matter, free speech.
We had been doing that which was politically correct. The Confeder-
ate flag offended some students, and getting rid of it as a symbol might help
race relations, improve the university's image (possibly the state's as well),
and encourage more minority students to consider attending the university.
We had not, however, considered the message that we were attempting to
stifle-the feelings and emotions that many people were trying to express
by waving the Confederate flag. We had only thought about making this
campus a nicer place where everyone would get along together. As long as
our intentions were good, we thought, our actions were justified.28 Of
course, had this same justification been given by someone who was trying
to quiet a war protester or silence a civil rights activist, everyone who sup-
ported the effort to stop the flag would have been outraged.
Taking a banner out of a hand because it conveys an offensive message
is censorship of the same magnitude as burning a book. We were so con-
cerned about race relations and complying with the First Amendment that
we did not consider the true impact of our actions. Even if we could avoid
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, we were trying to restrict free
expression. The Confederate flag symbolizes many different messages.
People who wave it might be expressing racial bigotry, but even offensive
speech is entitled to protection.2 9 For most of the students and alumni who
27. The comment was made by my friend and former colleague, Tim Hall, now president of
Austin Peay University.
28. The end result of racial justice can be seductive. See Mark Cammack & Susan Davies,
Should Hate Speech be Prohibited in Law Schools?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 145, 163-71 (1991) (setting forth
seemingly valid reasons why one might want to prohibit certain types of speech).
29. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (finding that government may not pro-
hibit speech just because it is offensive); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (same); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... "); Gerald Gunther, Good Speech, Bad
Speech: Should Universities Restrict Expression that is Racist or Otherwise Denigrating?, STANFORD
LAWYER (1990) (referring to the "elementary First Amendment principle that our Constitution usually
protects even offensive, harmful expression"); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 435 (Although he concludes that it is
proper to control racist speech on campus, Professor Lawrence also agrees that "[t]here are very strong
reasons for protecting even racist speech.").
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waved the Confederate flag, the message was not intended to be offensive
in any way.3°
We had the best of intentions, but as the former president of Yale,
Benno Schmidt, stated, "use of university authority to suppress freedom' is
'typically' the result of 'the best of intentions." 31 Twenty-five years ago,
NYU Law Professor Arthur Miller (then at Harvard) cautioned about the
dangers of allowing any individual or group to restrict expression, even
when it is done for seemingly worthy reasons:
[S]elf-appointed censors may have an argument to justify
their activities, but it's not a very good one. The notion that
certain forms of expression-such as dramatic presentations
deemed to be sexist-should be suppressed has a seductive
appeal to those who strongly oppose the message of the
speech and particularly to those who feel personally
threatened by its implications. But this is the same attitude
that led to the banning of Ulysses and The Rabbits' Wed-
dingFalse Our experience, especially in light of the legal
struggle over government attempts at censorship, informs us
of a guiding principle-namely that no one group, and no
one set of values, has a monopoly on truth. We cannot trust
others, or even ourselves, to decide what is and what isn't
harmful to be seen, heard, or understood by the rest of
society.32
30. Having been born in Ohio and brought up in the Midwest, I will evermore be a "Yankee" to
true Mississippians, but I have spent most of my adult life south of the Mason-Dixon line. I also mar-
ried a southern "belle." As such, I have devoted a great deal of time to understanding the South. The
realization that I was trying to restrict free speech caused me to examine the message behind the flag,
and I reached some conclusions that help me better to understand the willingness of southerners to
embrace symbols that could easily be seen as vestiges of slavery and a rejection of national values.
Whereas most northern cities have neighborhoods flavored by cultural identities, the same is not
true in the South. Southern cities have no European ethnic centers. There is no Greek-town, no Little
Italy, and no German neighborhood. Once upon a time, ethnic restaurants were few and far between.
There may be racial pockets, but most European descendants have lost any sense of ethnic identity. For
the average southerner, the "old country" is neither Poland nor France, it is the Confederacy.
For many southerners, thoughts of the Old South conjure up visions of Rhett Butler and Scarlet
O'Hara dancing across a ballroom floor. The civility and decorum depicted in the movie Gone With the
Wind are a heritage people can point to with pride. While most southerners readily admit that slavery
was an evil part of that society, they feel that it is unfair to ask them to abandon their entire heritage.
Other countries have also had very dark hours, but no one has tried to prohibit other Americans from
celebrating their heritage. To many southerners, the celebration of their culture is no more threatening
than, for instance, a German Octoberfest. Accordingly, many who embrace the symbols of the Old
South have no intent to offend others by their actions. They are simply celebrating their heritage.
While they may be viewed as insensitive to the feelings of some, it is wrong to attribute evil intentions
to their actions.
31. George Will, Curdled Politics on Campus, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 72 (quoting Benno
Schmidt). See generally D'souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1991; William A. Henry III, Upside Down in the Groves of Academe, TIME, Apr. 1,
1991, at 66; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 211 (1991) (discussing hate speech and accomodationalist proposals).
32. ARTHUR R. MILLER, MILLER'S COURT 87 (Houghton Mifflin Company 1982).
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We may "know" that our position is the most enlightened, that we are
not seeking to entrench ourselves in power, and that our opponents do not
have any serious academic challenges to our position, but it is still wrong to
stifle dissent. It is especially dangerous to give any individual or group the
authority to restrict expression; history teaches that such power is rarely
used in a judicious manner.33
Ole Miss is not the only campus at which the desire to be supportive of
all students has come into conflict with free speech. In response to real or
perceived acts of bigotry, 34 several students, faculty members, and adminis-
trators have called for a prohibition on offensive speech.35  Such restric-
tions have been justified based upon a "right to avoid having one's feelings
33. See Strossen, supra note 25, at 536 ("History demonstrates that if the freedom of speech is
weakened for one person, group, or message, then it is no longer there for others."). A student at the
University of Connecticut was expelled from University dining halls and residences for posting a sign
on her door indicating that "bimbos," "preppies," "racists," and "homos" would be shot on sight. Cam-
mack & Davies, supra note 28, at 148. Of course, it was the word "homo" that got her into trouble. Id.
Presumably, bimbos, preppies, and racists were either wise enough to recognize that this was not actu-
ally a threat, or it was okay to shoot them. Several schools have punished students for expressing
religious objections to homosexuality. Henry, supra note 31, at 67. At the University of Washington, a
student was punished for questioning the professor's assertion that lesbians make the best mothers. Id.
At the University of Michigan, a student asked to be moved to another room when he discovered that
his roommate was a homosexual and had pinned up pictures of nude men in the room. After a long
administrative hassle, the University finally agreed to move him, but warned him not to disclose the
reason why he had been moved at the risk of facing university charges of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. D'Souza, supra note 31, at 55.
34. See Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 176-78 (1990) (detailing several racist incidents on American
campuses); see also Cammack & Davies, supra note 28, at 145 (same); Lawrence, supra note 29, at 431-
34 (same); David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of University
Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 826 (1991) (same); Tom Morganthau, Race on
Campus: Failing the Test?, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 26-27 (same); David Rosenberg, Note, Racist
Speech, the First Amendment, and Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 549, 551-52 (1991) (same).
35. See Mary Beth Marklein, On Campus: Free Speech For You But Not For Me?, USA TODAY,
Nov. 3, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.comnews/washington/2003-11-02-free-speech-
coverx.htm. Several specific examples are documented in D'Souza, supra note 31. See also Cammack
& Davies, supra note 28, at 148 (finding that the invalidation of the University of Michigan's hate
speech policy led to cancellation of similar policies by other schools). Doe v. University of Michigan,
721 F. Supp. 852, 856-58 (E.D. Mich. 1989). That code authorized sanctions (ranging from formal repri-
mand to expulsion) for "[any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status." Id. at 856. According to an interpretive guide,
examples of conduct that would be sanctionable included a male student remarking that "[w]omen just
aren't as good in this field as men"; the exclusion of a person from a party or a study group because of
their sexual preference, race, or ethnic identity; laughter at a joke about someone who stutters; or
membership in a student organization that "sponsors entertainment that includes a comedian who slurs
Hispanics." Id. at 858. Of particular relevance to this paper, a student would be deemed a "harasser" if
he or she displayed a Confederate flag "on the door of your room in the residence hall." Id.; Morgan-
thau, supra note 34, at 27 (quoting a Harvard student who displayed a Confederate flag from the win-
dow of her dorm room) ("If they talk about 'diversity,' they're gonna get it ... If they talk about
tolerance, they'd better be ready to have it."); see also Arlynn L. Presser, The Politically Correct Law
School: Where It's Right to be Left, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1991, at 52, 55 (quoting Alan Dershowitz)
("How many politically correct students are demanding - in the name of diversity - an increase in the
number of evangelical Christians, National Rifle Association members and Right to Life advocates?").
The Michigan code was challenged by a psychology student who feared that his discussion of "contro-
versial theories positing biologically based differences between the [races and sexes]" might subject him
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hurt."36 Campus administrators have been quoted as saying, "'[t]here are
higher values than free speech."37  One college official explained,
"'[f]reedom of expression is no more sacred than freedom from intolerance
or bigotry."38 With these justifications, almost 200 universities around the
country introduced regulations prohibiting offensive speech, both in and
out of the classroom.39 Punishment for violating these rules varied from
forced apologies to expulsion.40
Many university speech codes ended up being declared unconstitu-
tional,4a but university administrators are not dumb. They took the same
to sanctions. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867-68. It was held unconstitutional on the grounds that it was both
overbroad and vague. Id. at 864-67. The administration typically attempted to convince the accused
student to accept "voluntary" sanctions, with the subtle threat of a formal hearing as the alternative.
Id. at 866; see Walter Shapiro, Failing to Make the Grade, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 71 (reviewing Dinesh
D'souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics Of Race And Sex On Campus, supra note 31) (Michigan's
speech code called an "affront to civil liberties"). Even Professor Lawrence, who supports controlling
racist speech, found the Michigan regulations "clearly overbroad." Lawrence, supra note 29, at 478
n.162. The difficulty of preparing a contitutional speech code is illustrated by the fact that, despite this
unanimity of opinion on the unconstitutionality of this code, it was prepared with the assistance of the
university counsel and several law professors. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 855.; see generally McGowan &
Tangri, supra note 34, at 831-33 (discussing Doe); Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 554-59 (same).
36. Henry, supra note 31, at 66, 67; see also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 380-81 (suggesting similar justifica-
tions for speech regulations).
37. Ron Grossman, Academia's Anarchist a Hit in Hyde Park, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 5, 1991,
Section 5, at 1, 8 (quoting "more than one college administrator"); see also Henry, supra note 31, at 67
("According to a growing number of academic theorists, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech can be legitimately laid aside for worthy reasons."); cf Deborah R. Schwartz, Note, A First
Amendment Justification for Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 733, 799
(1989-90) (arguing that racist epithets, but not racist ideas, are properly subject to restrictions).
38. Henry, supra note 31, at 67 (quoting John Jeffries, Associate Dean of the Graduate School of
Management and Urban Policy at New York City's New School for Social Research).
39. Breaking the Code, NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 7, 8; see also D'Souza, supra note 31, at 52
(discussing censorship regulation in universities); Henry, supra note 31, at 67 (discussing the recent
trend in university regulation of speech). For a list of schools that adopted regulations restricting racist
speech, see Lawrence, supra note 29, at 436 n.28, 450 (reprinting Stanford's regulations); McGowan &
Tangri, supra note 34, at 830 n.26 (estimating that 70% of colleges and universities have adopted restric-
tions on offensive speech); Strossen, supra note 25, at 488 n.14 (noting that 60% of reporting campuses
had enacted written policies on bigotry, racial harassment, or intimidation, and 11% more were work-
ing on such policies); cf Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 867-68 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(noting that Yale refused to enact such a code).
40. D'Souza, supra note 31, at 54. Even codes that authorize no formal punishment can have a
chilling effect on speech. Mark Cammack and Susan Davies refer to the speech code at State University
of New York at Buffalo as "admonish[ing] students to adhere to a nonenforceable standard of con-
duct." Cammack & Davies, supra note 28, at 159. That code states that "'remarks based on prejudice
and group stereotype will generate critical responses and swift, open condemnation by the faculty."' Id.
at 159 n.99.
41. So far, the courts have been unwilling to uphold university speech restrictions. In Doe v.
University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), the court rejected a speech code premised
upon the "hostile environment" theory of speech restrictions. Two years later, a similar ruling brought
to an end the speech code at the University of Wisconsin. See UWM Post Inc. v. Bd. of Regents. 774 F.
Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Similarly, the First Amendment protected a fraternity from punishment
for sponsoring an "ugly woman contest," even though the contest's message "ran counter to the views
the university sought to communicate to its students and the community." Iota Xi Chapter v. George
Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
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basic definitions and write them into campus regulations prohibiting har-
assment. According to the documentary file Indoctrinate U.,42 these new
provisions have been invoked to punish students for such things as writing
an op-ed, publishing political cartoons, and hanging up posters announcing
a speech. The Foundation for Individual rights in Education, which tracks
matters like this, lists well over 100 recent cases it has handled, and reports
that it has represented thousands of students and professors who had their
free speech threatened.43 Sometimes this happens at law schools.
In 2002, Harvard Law School came very close to adopting a restrictive
speech code.44 Harvard Law Professor Charles Ogletree has opined that
the "First Amendment was written to protect,... [but] the press is now the
oppressor, finding fuel in the First Amendment to persecute and con-
demn.''45 Another Harvard law professor proposed establishment of what
has been called an "unHarvard Activities Committee" to monitor politi-
cally incorrect and offensive speech.
Professor Alan Dershowitz, saw that there was something wrong with
the way his colleagues at Harvard were thinking: "[t]here is something very
wrong at Harvard Law School ...for too many radical professors and
students, freedom of speech for those who disagree with them is just 'not
their thing'."
46
Other law schools actually put speech codes them in place. The State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School faculty, for instance,
adopted a resolution prohibiting students from making "remarks directed
at another's race, sex, religion, national origin, age or sexual preference.
47
Students who violated the rule, it was said, were not be protected by the
42. See Kevin Mooney, New Film Exposes Apparent Lack of Academic Freedom in US, CNN-
News.com, Oct. 08, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=/Culture/archive/200710/
CUL20071008b.html . For the movie's web page, see http://www.indoctrinate-u.com/intro.
43. The web page for the Foundation for Individual rights in Education permits the viewer to
examine many recent cases: http://www.thefire.org/index.php/. One of the more interesting cases in-
volves conservative protest of the appearance of Ward Churchill, the former University of Colorado
professor who called the people killed in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, "Little
Eichmanns." See FIRE Letter to DePaul University President Dennis Holtschneider, Nov. 23, 2005,
available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6620.html.
44. See, e.g., ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, THE PEOPLE v. HARVARD LAW: How AMERICA'S OLD-
EST LAW SCHOOL TURNED ITS BACK ON FREE SPEECH (Encounter Books 2005) (in 2002, two students
and two professors made statements regarded by black students as offensive, resulting in protests and
support for the adoption of a speech code that would punish anyone who used words deemed offensive
by members of selected minorities; it was not enacted). Cammack & Davies, supra note 28, at 145
(noting acts of racist behavior at Columbia Law School, New York University Law School, and State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School). In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the
Supreme Court held that even hate speech was a protected form of discourse, necessary to the market-
place of ideas and the pursuit of truth. Shortly thereafter, Howard Law Journal ran a lead article
entitled Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities After R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 37 How. L. J. 1
(1993) (by Lawrence Friedman).
45. Charles Ogletree, Perspective On The Simpson Trial; Media Put Justice In Harm's Way; The
First Amendment Was Meant As A Shield For The Oppressed, But The Press Has Now Become The
Oppressor, LA TiMES, Oct. 12, 1994.
46. Fox Butterfield, Parody Puts Harvard Law Faculty in Sexism Battle, NY TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992,
at A10.
47. D'Souza, supra note 31, at 55 (quoting the faculty resolution).
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First Amendment, because "'our intellectual community shares values that
go beyond a mere standardized commitment to open and unrestrained
debate."48
Restrictions on speech have had serious adverse effects on the aca-
demic community. After all, the threat of sanctions can have a serious chil-
ling effect on those involved in academic debate. There is "an enormous
unwillingness among students to even argue hypothetically for the 'wrong'
side in matters that touch upon [political correctness] because of a fear of
being labelled an -ist of some sort: racist, sexist, heterosexist, classist,
ableist."'49 Some law professors resorted to allowing students to express
"incorrect" arguments on anonymous notes that are then read in class.50 It
has even been suggested that law students should not study judicial deci-
sions reflecting negative racial stereotypes. 51 The President of New York's
Bard College explained, "'Nobody wants to listen to the other side. On
many campuses, you really have a culture of forbidden questions."5" Ac-
cordingly, universities are being gutted of their primary function, the pro-
cess of learning. As one college president asked: "'What the hell is a
university all about if not open debate?"53
During the height of the campus speech code frenzy, I once got wor-
ried that I had crossed the line. It was in environmental law class, and we
were talking about disposal of hazardous waste. The case we were studying
involved a company which had hired another company to dispose of haz-
ardous waste.54 The disposal company charged only about half of what its
competitors charged. The catch was that the company did not properly
dispose of the waste; it simply dumped the waste by the roadside out in the
country.
It is not very hard to find the disposal company criminally and civilly
liable in such a case. That was not in dispute. The issue we were looking at
related to the responsibility of the company that produced the waste-the
company which had hired the low-cost disposal company.
48. Id. (quoting the faculty resolution). Georgetown University considered disciplinary action
against a law student who disclosed that the law school was lowering its standards to admit more Afri-
can-American students. McGowan & Tangri, supra note 34, at 830 n.25; Morganthau, supra note 34, at
27; Presser, supra note 35, at 53.
49. Presser, supra note 35, at 53.
50. Id. (This tactic has been employed by N.Y.U. law professor and ACLU president, Nadline
Strossen.).
51. Strossen, supra note 25, at 529 n.217; see also Cammack & Davies, supra note 28, at 146 ("It
is our conclusion that it is appropriate, as a matter of educational and liberal theory, to prohibit law
students from expressing themselves in the language of racist, sexist, and anti-ethnic insults directed
against groups that have traditionally been the subject of ideas or theories of inferiority.").
52. Henry, supra note 31, at 66 (quoting Leon Bostein, President of Bard College).
53. D'Souza, supra note 31, at 67 (quoting Malcolm Gillis, Vice-Provost at Duke University); see
also McGowan & Tangri, supra note 34, at 907 (discussing instances where political postures have inter-
fered with classroom discussions).
54. U.S. v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 1039 (holding government not required to show that defendant knew that facility
lacked a permit as element of the RCRA disposal crime); see also U.S. v. Hays Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d
1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
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The court found responsibility based upon the low price being charged
by the disposal company. 56 In other words the court found that the com-
pany which produced the waste must have known about the disposal com-
pany's business practices. Therefore, it was responsible along with the
disposal company.
That is when I said something that could have gotten me into trouble.
It was sort of a joke, and it drew a few mild laughs, but it mainly was an
observation. I said, "It's like when you were a kid and you looked in the
back of comic books. They always advertised those x-ray glasses. They
made it seem like you could see through Susie's dress, but you knew that
was too good to be true."
I did not mean for this to be a sexist comment. I did not plan it out in
advance. It was simply a point that hit me as a funny example of what the
court had essentially concluded. If something seems too good to be true, it
probably is.
As a few people chuckled, it occurred to me that I had done exactly
the kind of thing that was getting professors into trouble all over the na-
tion. If the students went down to the dean's office and reported me, I
might have been in trouble. Fortunately, none did.
One might think that I had no room to complain, given that my "in-
fraction" went completely unpunished. But this is not the case. The tyr-
anny of this new sensibility is not limited to those who have been
disciplined. The worse impact comes from the self-censorship of teachers
that restricts classroom discussions due to the fear of harassment charges.
A good teacher or thinker must be free to think and express ideas.
Often the hardest part of learning to teach is learning how to break down
your own internal inhibitions. You must step away from the podium. You
have to depart from the written text. You must pull together all of those
skills that are necessary to logical persuasion-logic, emotion, and
credibility.
Emotion, in particular, is important but often overlooked part of
learning.57 If I can get a student emotionally involved in a case, he or she
will better focus on the issues and remember the arguments longer. It is
not unusual for me to bring up controversial positions, ones which I believe
to be incorrect, just to stimulate the debate among the students. These
debates, when they work properly, are among the greatest learning vehicles
that a teacher has at his or her disposal. To work properly, however, the
teacher and the student must be free to explore new avenues, question es-
tablished solutions, and propose new observations without risking more
than the embarrassment which comes from being charged with
insensitivity.
56. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039.
57. See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Humorous Origins of the Green Movement. The Three Stooges as
Early Environmentalists, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 35, n.1 (1995). (Aristotle's Rhetoric 1.2 discussed three
aspects of persuasion: moral character (ethos), emotion (pathos), and logic (logos)).
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The fear of embarrassment alone is sufficient to keep most people
from participating in public debates. If the authority in power, be it an
administrator, a teacher, a judge, or some other figure adds another level of
intimidation, the debate necessarily becomes less effective. In fact, if the
level of intimidation (punishment) increases to an oppressive level, no ef-
fective debate can even come into being.5 8 In the classroom, that means the
debate is stifled and students are deprived of an important learning experi-
ence. In other words, there are many more victims of political oppression
than the few who are occasionally identified by the press.59
The movement to control speech on campus is born out of legitimate
concern for the well-being of students, but the very concept of a speech
code, with prior restraint and restricted debate, is anti-educational. 60 Even
if those in control do not want to enforce the regulations except in extreme
cases, the chilling effect on those who are concerned about the potential
punishment (or even about officially being branded as a bigot by the insti-
tution) will surely stifle the free and robust exchange of ideas that is so
critical to the campus climate.61
IV. THE INTERNET AND FREE EXPRESSION
In light of my interest in free speech, not just the First Amendment, I
was particularly delighted when in 2004, the State Department invited me
58. As illustrated in Doe v. Board of Regents, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), students are
keenly aware of the risk of sanctions. That, in turn, interferes with the learning process.
59. Offensive speech should instead be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Strossen, supra note
25, at 507 ("[T]he question whether any particular racist speech should be subject to regulation is a fact-
specific inquiry. We cannot define particular words as inherently off limits, but rather we must examine
every word in the overall context in which it was uttered.") (footnotes omitted). One could imagine
instances where harassment on campus should lead to punishment; however, it is unlikely that any
regulation needs to be enacted to cover those situations. If harassment becomes routine, it is likely to
come from no more than a very small group of people. The standard remedy in such cases would be to
seek a narrowly tailored injunction to prohibit the offensive speech from being directed from one spe-
cific person to another specific person. Perhaps universities could, after an appropriate hearing, issue
something similar to an injunction in situations where verbal expression has gotten out of hand. That
would certainly be preferable to the speech codes and chilled debate that we are now seeing on college
campuses. In almost every such case, there is likely to be conduct that is punishable, not mere speech.
"It makes better sense, legally and morally, to prosecute someone for harassment, trespassing, or dis-
turbing the peace without judging the content of their expression than it does to proscribe certain forms
of expression." Breaking the Code, supra note 39, at 8.
60. Debates about offensive speech on campus will continue, since this type of speech may come
close to unprotected speech. For instance, face-to-face speech may constitute "fighting words,"
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-573 (1942), or be deemed likely to produce "imminent
lawless action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), and therefore fall outside the First
Amendment. See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (describing racist speech as "outside the realm of protected discourse"); cf
Sean M. SeLegue, Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 919, 931-33 (questioning the continuing viability of the "fighting words" exception); Strossen,
supra note 25, at 508-14 (same). But see U.M.W. Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F.Supp. 1163, 1172-73
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (finding that the University of Wisconsin's speech code went well beyond the fighting
words exception). As a general rule, however, the chilling effect that necessarily follows any speech
code is undesirable.
61. Strossen, supra note 25, at 528. In addition to being a tool used to oppress minorities, speech
codes "[m]ake bigots into First Amendment martyrs and [elevate] noxious prejudices to the status of
political ideas." Breaking the Code, supra note 39, at 8.
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to Paris for a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). 6 2  This was the first-ever conference on Internet hate
speech.63 The purpose was to examine how governments could work to-
gether to fight harmful effects of hate on the Internet, and my role would
be to present the U.S. position on free speech.64 To me, defending free
speech was like defending mom, baseball, and apple pie. Unfortunately,
when I got to Paris I was stuck defending terrorists, Skinheads, and Nazis.
A. European Free Speech
Unlike the USA, many European nations have criminalized hate
speech. The precise national laws, of course, vary from one country to the
next. Consider, however, the German Penal Code which specifically
targets hate speech.65 Under Article 131 of that code it is illegal to write or
broadcast anything that incites racial hatred or describes "cruel or other-
wise inhuman acts of violence in a manner which glorifies or minimizes
such acts."6 6 Other sections prohibit insults to personal honor and defam-
ing the memory of the dead.67
62. The meeting was part of an OSCE focus on racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and anti-
Semitism.
63. Christopher Wolf, A Comment on Private Harms in the Cyber-World, 62 WASH. & LEE
L.REV., 355 (2005).
64. The U.S. Delegation to the Paris meeting was jointly led by Ambassador Stephan M.
Minikes, head of the U.S. Mission to the OSCE; R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights; and Dan Bryant, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy. Markham Erickson, Gen-
eral Counsel from Net Coalition; Brian Marcus, Director of Internet Monitoring; Anti-Defamation
League and I joined the delegation as Public Members. The full texts of statements circulated at the
Paris meeting by the United States and other participants are available through the OSCE's Internet
web site at http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2004/09/3642_en.pdf.
65. Germany first applied its Criminal Code to the Internet in 1995, when the Munich Public
Prosecutor investigated CompuServe for violating obscenity regulations. Fearing criminal sanctions,
CompuServe blocked access to 200 Web sites for four million subscribers in 147 countries. In 1996, the
Manheim Public Prosecutor's office formally charged a German citizen residing in Canada, with violat-
ing Section 131 of the German Criminal Code (depiction of violence). While the German citizen pub-
lished his Holocaust-denial Web site in the United States, Section 9 of the German Criminal Code
attaches liability to anyone who commits a crime that has effects within German borders. German
courts have upheld and rigorously enforced these regulations. Germans, like many European nationals,
do not see this as a violation of free speech. The Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, the foundation of the
German constitutional system, includes broad guarantees for free expression. Section 1 of article 5 of
the German Basic Law provides: "Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion
in speech, writing, and pictures and to freely inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom
of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There will be
no censorship." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 5, sec. 1 (F.R.G.). On the other hand, section
2 of that same article provides: "These rights are subject to limitations in the provisions of general
statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of the youth, and in the right to personal honor.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 5, sec. 2 (F.R.G.).
66. Article 2.1 states that "everyone shall have the right to the free development of his/her per-
sonality in so far as he/she does not violate the rights of others or offend the constitutional order or
moral code." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2.1 (F.R.G.); Article 10.1 proclaims that the "pri-
vacy of posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable,"while article 10.2 states that 'this right may be
restricted [by] statute." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 10.1, 10.2 (F.R.G.).
67. Section 191 of the code also authorizes criminal prosecution for distribution of insulting or
defamatory broadcast statements concerning victims or members of groups prosecuted by the Nazis or
other totalitarian regimes. Using this authority, German lawmakers passed comprehensive Internet
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We Americans would also prefer that people generally not insult per-
sonal honor or the memory of the dead. In fact, we have laws relating to
defamation, slander, and libel that can sometimes be used against a
speaker. We do not, however, believe in prior restraints. We tend to let
people say things. Then, and only then, we may take some kind of legal
action to hold the speaker responsible, usually in a civil action. Europeans
are much more likely to use their criminal laws. Consider the following:
1. In June of 2004 (just days before I was to speak in Paris
on the importance of free speech), actress Brigitte Bardot
was convicted of inciting racial hatred and ordered to pay
$6,000 (the fourth such fine imposed on Bardot since 1997)
because she wrote a book lamenting the "Islamization of
France.
'61
2. British researcher David Irving has been expelled form
Canada, fined and imprisoned in Germany, and denied a
visa to enter Australia, all because of his controversial views
on the Holocaust.69
3. In Italy, author Robert Katz was given a 14-month sus-
pended prison sentence and ordered to pay a fine because
one of his books defamed Pope Pius XII, even though the
pontiff had long-since departed and the events at question
had taken place a quarter of a century before Katz wrote his
agenda-driven book.7 °
4. A French court ordered that Internet provider Yahoo!,
Inc. eliminate French citizens' access to Nazi-related mate-
rial on the Yahoo.com auction site and subjected Yahoo! to
a penalty of 100,000 Euros for each day that it failed to com-
ply with the order.7'
content control legislation, the Information and Communication Services Act ("ICSA"). This Act sub-
jects Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to liability for knowingly making illegal content, such as Holo-
caust denial material, "available for use" if it is "technically possible to halt in transmission." The ICSA
mandates the creation of a "cyber sheriff[ ]" to search out objectionable content. The ICSA also makes
it a crime to disseminate or make accessible materials deemed harmful to children.
68. Bardot Convicted Of Inciting Racial Hatred, NY TIMES, June 11, 2004, available at http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htmlres=9802EOD91530F932A25755COA9629C8B63.
69. The German Constitutional Court has recently said that the extermination of 6 million Jews
in Hitler's concentration camps is a fact and that Holocaust denial is a "proven untruth;" therefore,
those who spread the "Auschwitz Lie" are not protected by the basic law's guarantees of freedom of
opinion and may be banned from stating their inaccurate views in public. BBC News, Holocaust Denier
Irving is Jailed, Feb. 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uklIhi/world/europe/4733820.stm ( after pleading
guilty to having said, in 1989, that there were no gas chambers at Aushwitz, Irving was sentenced, in
2006, to three years imprisonment).
70. See RONALD J. RYCHLAK, RIGHTEOUS GENTILES: How PIus XII AND THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH SAVED HALF A MILLION JEWS FROM THE NAZIS 240-44 (Spence Publishing 2005).
71. The order was not fully enforceable against Yahoo!, an American corporation, but the com-
pany did change some procedures in response to the French court's order. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Clearly, matters that Americans consider to be protected speech are
prohibited in many European nations.
In 2002 the Council of Europe voted to outlaw "acts of a racist and
xenophobic nature conducted through computer systems."'7 2 The Council
proclaimed that it "considers racism not as an opinion but as a crime."
73
The Council emphasized that "[n]ot only racism, but also the dissemination
of hate speech against certain nationalities, religions and social groups must
be opposed.
74
The first ever international treaty on criminal offenses on the Internet,
the Convention on Cybercrime, was opened for signature in November
2001. That convention does not directly prohibit hate speech, but the
"Committee of Experts on the Criminalization of Racist or Xenophobic
Acts Using Computer Networks" drafted an Additional Protocol that calls
for the criminalization of hate speech on the Internet.75
The United States signed the Convention on Cybercrime, but it has
not (and will not) sign the Additional Protocol. The American Constitu-
tion protects free speech to a degree that the laws of most European na-
tions do not.76 As such, the U.S. will not ban hate unless we consider it to
be harassment, incitement to imminent lawlessness, or a threat. Most hate
web pages do not go that far, so they are legal in the United States.
72. Michelle Madigan, Internet Hate-Speech Ban Called 'Chilling,' Council of Europe's Internet
Restrictions Raise Uneasy Questions About Civil Rights Online, Medill News Service, Dec. 2, 2002, http:/
/www.pcworld.com/article/id,107499-page,l/article.html. The measure was added to the Convention on
Cybercrime, criminalizing hacking, intellectual property violations, and use of computers to commit
fraud. The first set of rules was signed in November 2001.
73. The Council of Europe-not to be confused with the European Union-comprises 44 Euro-
pean countries, plus a handful of non-European nations. Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and the
United States have observer status only.
74. The Convention on Cybercrime defines racist and xenophobic material as "written material,
images or other representations of ideas or theories advocating, promoting or inciting hatred, discrimi-
nation or violence against individuals or groups, based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic
origin, or religion." Madigan, supra note 72.
75. The Additional Protocol imposed obligations on state parties to criminalize the following acts
of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems:
1. The dissemination of racist and xenophobic material;
2. Racist and xenophobic motivated threats;
3. Racist and xenophobic motivated insults;
4. Revisionism; and
5. Aiding and abetting in the above activities.
Only material made available to the public is prohibited; one-to-one communications are not covered.
See Report, Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, http://conventions.coe.intl
Treaty/enfrreatieslHtml/189.htm.
76. The European Union has expressed its approval and support of the Convention on Cyber-
crime and of its initiative on the Additional Protocol. It established the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom ("ECHR") to promote the "safer use of the
Internet by combating illegal and harmful content," including "racist and xenophobic ideas."
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B. The OSCE Meeting in Paris
Since most European nations have regulations restricting online hate
speech,77 racists, Holocaust revisionists, Islamic radicals, homophobes, and
seemingly every other intolerant group seek refuge on American ISPs.
78
They take full advantage of the First Amendment's protection of speech,
even though many of these web pages are put up in German, French,
Arabic, or other languages, and they are clearly aimed at a non-American
readership.79 Of course, hate posted in any nation can be accessed from
every nation.80 As such, the OSCE meeting in Paris was largely a matter of
Europeans trying to convince Americans that they had to find some way to
"get around" the limitations of the First Amendment.81 Robert Badinter,
77. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"), Governing the Internet:
Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region (Christian M611er & Arnaud Amouroux, eds. 2007), avail-
able at www.osce.org/publicationsrfm/2007/07/25667_918_en.pdf.
78. "Robert Badinter, a former French justice minister, complained that of 4,000 'racist sites'
counted worldwide in 2002, some 2,500 were based in the United States." ZGram, Censors trying to
harness the Net, June 23, 2004, available at http://zgrams.zundelsite.orgpipermail/zgrams/2004-June/
000886.html. Internet hate speech can be found in almost any flavor: anti-gay, anti-Black, anti-White,
anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic, anti-women, anti-American, and everything in between. Moreover, hate
groups are not limited to text messages; hate music, interactive video games, and streaming audio
broadcasts can be found on many of the estimated 4,000 hate-oriented web pages. Hate organizations
also create web sites that resemble the domain names of legitimate news organizations and link those
addresses to their hateful web pages. For example, one purveyor of hate bought the rights to domain
names that appeared to link the viewer to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the
Chicago Sun-Times, the Atlanta Constitution, and the London Telegraph. Instead of pulling up the web
pages of those news outlets, however, unsuspecting Internet users end up visiting white-nationalist
pages. Hate sites also routinely pop up in standard Internet searches.
79. In documenting the movement of "foreign haters" to the United States, Rabbi Abraham
Cooper of the Los Angeles-based Simon Weisenthal Center found a "skyrocketing" number of hate-
related sites in the United States. He notes that "the single largest growth is from European extremist
groups migrating their Web sites to the U.S." Victoria Shannon, From France, Yahoo Case Resonates
Around Globe, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 22, 2000, http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/11/
22/yahoo.2.t_0.php.
80. In his opening speech, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said:
We have to be able to act directly against those that commit these crimes. On our own terri-
tory, we have decided to take measures against these activities, by toughening the laws dealing
with crimes motivated by racism, anti-Semitism or xenophobia, by holding Internet providers
responsible for their sites, and by systematically searching for hate speech in the media. How-
ever, one State can only do so much. The Internet does not have any boundaries. The OSCE
must become an 'observatory to identify and help propagate best practices, and, based on this
work, it must also act as a 'laboratory' where, for example, a code of conduct could be
developed.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, States Called to Act Against Hate Speech on the
Internet, available at http://www.hrea.org/lists/wcarlmarkup/msg00234.html.
81. One of the sub-texts of the meeting was the putative "Atlantic Divide." See Christopher
Wolf, A Comment on Private Harms in the Cyber-World, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 355, 360 (Winter
2005). In the context of discussions of "cyber hate" and hate crimes, this phrase was used to describe
the perceived gulf between the United States' and Europe's approaches to hate propaganda. Id. at 360-
361. According to the adherents of the "Atlantic Divide" theory, the United States is a free-speech
Wild West, where speech has no limitations or legal consequences. Id. at 361. Europe, in contrast, is
portrayed as a unified region speaking with one voice, populated by those who have wisely learned
from the horrors of World War II that dangerous speech can and must be sanctioned and that govern-
ments are easily capable of performing this task and do so as a matter of course. Id. at 360. "A number
of Europeans bragged that their governments regularly censor harmful content on the Internet, and
that the world is a better place for it." Id. at 360-361.
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the Socialist former French Minister of Justice and current president of the
OSCE Court of Arbitration and Conciliation, in a keynote address, ap-
pealed to the United States to "stop hiding behind the First Amend-
ment. '8 2 The United States, on the other hand, argued that the First
Amendment was not a shield behind which we were hiding. Rather, it is a
banner that we hold high because we value free speech.83
In my presentation at the OSCE meeting, I told an assembly of repre-
sentatives from 55 nations that tolerance of diverse speech is so ingrained
into the American fabric that virtually every school boy and girl knows
Voltaire's famous statement: "I may not agree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it."84 Americans fear censorship
much more than they fear offensive speech.
We have the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis in America. Their rallies
are usually dwarfed by counter-rallies, and it seems to me that their argu-
ments never get significant traction, even within susceptible sub-cultures.8 5
One critic of speech regulation pretty much expressed my feeling when he
said: "for all [the hate groups'] vitriol, these people are only a tiny handful
of the 30-40 million users on the Internet... I'm far more concerned about
[the government] attacking the Net, and thus our freedom, than I am about
watching the Nazis."86
Unfortunately, I don't think my talk changed many European minds.
A later American speaker was complimented because he did not exhibit
"typical American arrogance." I've always assumed that - at least in the
eyes of the person who made that statement - I did exhibit typical Ameri-
can arrogance. Really though, I don't think it's arrogance.87 Our Ameri-
can view is that when speech crosses the line and becomes more than
82. Id. at 361. "While many constructive ideas were expressed, many speakers at the fifty-five
nation gathering harped on how the First Amendment impedes global efforts to reduce the incidence of
online hate." Id. at 360.
83. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the speech clause does "not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.") The Supreme Court indicated its reluctance to permit government regulation of racist or
otherwise derogatory speech. Id. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992), the Court struck
down a Minnesota city ordinance that banned speech that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others ... on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Justice Scalia noted that "the First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects." Id. Although the government may have a valid interest in protecting
individuals from hateful invective, such concerns do not overcome the constitutional protection of
speech. Similarly, in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Court overruled portions of the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), which criminalized the transmission of obscene and indecent
material over the Internet in a manner that was easily available to children.
84. Whether Voltaire actually said this is a matter of some dispute, though it is traditionally
attributed to him. See Hypernote.com, Would Voltaire Die That This Might Be Printed?, http://
www.hypernote.com/C745182673/E253798223/index.html.
85. In fact, these groups seem to be more active in Europe than in the United States.
86. The Ethical Spectacle, An Interview With Ken McVay, http://www.spectacle.org1695/
mcvay.html.
87. The ISP industry can and should develop "best practices" standards to facilitate cooperation
and mutual assistance between law enforcement authorities to ensure that effective action can be taken
against the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic material via the Internet. The best
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speech - when it presents a clear and present danger - the authorities must
be prepared to step in.88 At that time, the speech may constitute an actual
threat, harassment, or be an incitement to imminent lawlessness.89 When
speech becomes action, punishment can be warranted. 9°
Americans believe that ideas and opinions should be available in the
"marketplace of ideas," no matter how unpopular or offensive they may
be. This view, as adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, reflects the idea that
good and bad ideas should compete, and when that happens, with truth will
prevail and harmful speech will be tested and rejected. 9' Indeed, under the
approach would be based upon self-regulation or co-regulation, through developing codes of conduct,
and through increasing users' and providers' awareness and sensitivity to the problem. As a starting
point, ISPs should initiate a dialogue with all service providers to convince them of the need to take
steps to combat the existence of hate sites. Once an ISP promulgates such regulations, it must monitor
the use of its service to ensure that the regulations are followed. If a violation does occur, the ISP
should, as a contractual matter, take action to prevent it from happening again. Some ISPs do not
undertake contractual obligations but declare a "hate-free policy" and reserve the right to modify or
terminate their services at any time if the service is used for posting or transmitting objectionable mate-
rial. Of course, even if we could set aside constitutional issues, there are numerous technological chal-
lenges related to tracking, filtering, or blocking hate propaganda transmitted through the Internet,
emails, or text messaging. Asking ISPs to be responsible for screening all content on the web is not
feasible, anymore than making telephone companies responsible for everything that gets said over the
telephone. In fact, an ISP can create problems simply by trying to be responsible. One ISP removed an
innocuous site devoted to English philosopher John Stuart Mill after a non-governmental organization
- testing the bases upon which ISPs would act - urged the ISP to take down the allegedly racist site.
88. The issue of "hate crimes" is controversial because it can be seen as punishing thought or
expression. See George F. Cole & Christopher E. Smith, The American System of Criminal Justice 52
(8th ed. Wadsworth Pblishing Company 1998). I must admit to being troubled by hate crimes, in that
additional punishment may be imposed due to the perceived mindset of the defendant. See Anti-Chris-
tian Bill Passed in U.S. House, Christian Anti-Defamation Commission, Oct. 2007 (discussing The Local
Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007)). The Supreme
Court, however, has upheld the idea of increasing the punishment for crimes when the defendant "in-
tentionally selects the person against whom the crime [is committed] because of the race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person .. " Wisconsin v. Mitch-
ell, 508 U.S. 476, 481 (1993). In that case, the law was used to increase the punishment imposed against
a black defendant for inciting an attack against white victims.
89. In Paris, US officials provided examples of numerous recent cases where individuals were
prosecuted for sending email messages that rose to the level of being a racially motivated threat While
it is important that criminal sanctions based purely on one's opinion remain prohibited, cases such as
this should dispel the misimpression that there are no limitations on speech in the United States. In
February 1999, a Pennsylvania court entered an injunction against Web site owner and controller Ryan
Wilson, his white supremacist group ALPHA, and Stormfront, Inc. (which had been providing the
ALPHA Web site with domain name service), barring them from displaying certain messages on the
Internet. The order stemmed from charges filed against Ryan Wilson for terroristic threats, harassment
and ethnic intimidation. One of the pictures on Wilson's ALPHAWeb site depicted a bomb blowing up
the office of Bonnie Jouhari, a fair housing specialist who regularly organized anti-hate activities and
focused on issues concerning hate crimes, racial hatred and the activities of local hate groups. Next to
her picture, the ALPHAweb site stated "Traitors like this should beware, for in our day, they will be
hung from the neck from the nearest tree or lamp post." Wilson did not contest the state's action, and
the site was removed from the Internet. In early 2000, the Federal Office of Housing and Urban
Development filed a civil discrimination suit against Wilson. The U.S. Department of Justice reportedly
is also investigating Jouhari's case for possible criminal violations. Chris Wolf, Cyber-Hate on the In-
ternet, (Remarks of Christopher Wolf, Chair of the International Network Against Cyber-Hate, at the
Conference on Hate on the Internet, Co-hosted by the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the
Association of Canadian Studies), Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/proactiveinitiatives/hoi-hsi/
page9-en.asp.
90. Id.
91. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-606 (1967).
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U.S. Constitution, any governmental regulation that abridges speech based
on the content is presumptively invalid.
Legal restrictions on hate speech suppress the symptoms; they do not
treat the underlying causes of the social disease. Bringing hate speech into
the open allows dialogue, promotes rather than restricts the free flow of
ideas.92 This can alert us to the fact that something is wrong-in the body
politic, in ourselves, or in the speakers. Speech codes, ordinances, and stat-
utes (if they are enforced) only blind us to the problems and deny us the
opportunity to solve them before they become worse.
C. Do Europeans Know Better?
More than once, when debating the importance of free speech, I have
heard defenders of restrictions say that the European approach is better
because they "have seen what can happen." The point, of course, is to
suggest that Hitler and the Holocaust took place because the powers that
be (leaders of the Weimar Republic) did not stop him from speaking when
they had a chance. I have written two books on the Nazi era,93 and I think
that is the wrong lesson to take from history. Rather than being a result of
free speech, Nazism existed only because expression was limited.
The Nazis were prohibited from speaking in public following the failed
beer hall putsch of March 1923. Nazism was banned. Even after Hitler was
released from prison in December of 1924, he was still barred from speak-
ing in public for several months. He was permitted to revive his party only
by making several promises to the Bavarian authorities. 94 Of course, it was
during this time of imposed silence that Hitler actually rose to national
prominence and achieved the status of a hero in Germany. The efforts to
restrict his speech did nothing more than allow him to portray himself as a
victim fighting for the real German people, and he became all the more
popular.
The real concern about speech and the Nazis was not that they exer-
cised free speech prior to taking over. Rather, it is that they prohibited
free speech once they were in power. Freedom of the press, freedom of
speech, and the freedom to hold political meetings were all lost. You could
92. It should be noted that although the OSCE meeting in Paris was mandated to examine the
relationship between hate propaganda on the Internet and hate crimes, few participants actually dis-
cussed the nexus between these two phenomena. For many, the existence of a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship was accepted as an article of faith, and they did not explore the nature of that relationship. As
such, the meeting made little contribution to understanding which populations might be most vulnera-
ble to the influence of hate speech on the Internet, whether such speech fosters particular kinds of hate
crimes, whether web-based hate is related to spikes in hate crimes, or why some places with unregu-
lated content have relatively lower levels of hate crimes than other places with restricted Internet
content.
93. RONALD J. RYCHLAK, HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE (Our Sunday Visitor 2000); RON-
ALD J. RYCHLAK, RIGHTEOUS GENTILES: How PIUS XII AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SAVED HALF A
MILLION JEWS FROM THE NAZIS 240-44 (Spence Publishing 2005).
94. IAN KERSHAW, HITLER: 1889-1936: HUBRIS 262-63 (W. W. Norton & Company 2000).
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get the death penalty for listening to foreign radio stations.95 Anyone even
suspected of opposing Hitler was silenced. We are all aware of the notori-
ous Nazi book burnings and of the retaliation that was taken against any-
one who dared to stand up against the Nazis.
In 1937, when Pope Pius XI issued a condemnation of Nazi practices, it
had to be smuggled into Germany, copied and distributed secretly by an
army of motorcyclists, and read by the priests during services. All of the
copies that were discovered by the Nazis were confiscated. Presses that
had printed it were closed, and those convicted of distributing it were ar-
rested.96 Of course, the Nazis were able to point to their own history to find
precedents justifying restrictions on speec.
Defenders of speech restrictions often try to justify their actions by
arguing that they are protecting the vulnerable from hate-mongers, but - as
happened with the Nazis (and, by the way, Islamic radicals)97 - the parties
can get switched.98 At the OSCE meeting in Paris, one non-governmental
representative argued that evangelical Christian sites that reach out to Jews
in an effort to bring them to Christ should be considered anti-Semitic. Sim-
ilarly, with all the truly vicious hate web pages on the Internet, when the
Russian delegation had its turn to speak, it identified the web sites of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and Hare Krishnas as "promoting hate doctrines" be-
cause they purport to set forth "the truth." The American delegation
thought that this made our point more strongly than anything else could
have.
D. Free Speech in the Middle East
As you know, religion is often the target of ridicule in modern Ameri-
can culture. In 2006, I was part of a delegation that met in Rome with a
group of influential Iranian leaders to discuss the common origins of Chris-
tianity, Judaism, and Islam. Obviously, there were also significant political
overtones to these meetings. In my formal presentation, I was asked to
95. RiGTrrEous GENTILES, supra note 93, at 240; Catholic Historian's Report Details Perils of
'Martyrs of Vatican Radio', NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER, Feb. 1, 1976.
96. HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE, supra note 93, at 93-94.
97. There is an interesting parallel related to modern Islamic terrorism. Most modern Islamic
terror groups trace their roots back to a group known as the Muslim Brotherhood. On October 26,
1954, Muslim Brother Mahmoud Abd al Latif failed in an attempt to assassinate Egyptian leader
Gamal Abd an-Nasser (who had led a successful coup in 1952). Nasser then outlawed the Brotherhood
and over 4000 members were imprisoned, including Sayyid Qutb, who wrote highly influential books
while in prison and later became the most influential intellectual in the group. Today, the worst Islamic
governments are very severe in their restrictions on speech. Within the past few years, for instance,
Iran has shut down or sanctioned about 100 newspapers that dared to question governmental policy. In
other fundamentalist, Islamic nations, one would be hard pressed even to find 100 voices willing to
question the government.
98. History teaches that those with the least power (in this case, the supposed beneficiaries of
such regulations) are most often the victims of the abuses of power. See Presser, supra note 35, at 52, 55
(speech codes used to punish minority students). One of the U.S. recommendations made during the
meeting was that the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should examine whether hate
speech laws are being enforced in a discriminatory or selective manner or misused to suppress political
dissent.
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address the American notion of free speech in light of the riots that had
just taken place following the publication by a Danish newspaper of comics
that depicted the Prophet Mohammed.99
They Ayatollahs in the group felt that those in the West tolerated these
comics only because they knew it was an insult to Islam, not to Christianity.
They were not familiar with television programs like South Park or artwork
like Piss Christ, but I tried to explain that we Christians in the West see our
religions insulted and denigrated on a very regular basis. This is not good,
and I would prefer that it not happen, but it is consequence of our devotion
to free speech.
The result of my talk was a half hour lecture from an Ayatollah who
explained, in a heated voice while pointing his finger in my face, that Islam
would never tolerate insults to the Prophet, and we need to change our
ways and our concept of acceptable free speech. We at least needed to
prohibit anti-Islam speech if not all speech critical of religion.
E. Harassment of Religious Leaders
Actually, in those areas where speech restrictions are in place, relig-
ious leaders are more likely to be prosecuted by those codes than protected
by them.1"' Today, in many nations, religious leaders are threatened by
legal action if they speak openly about practices that their faiths consider
sinful. Brazilian legislators, for instance, are debating a "homophobia law."
According to reports, "Priests could face two to five years of imprisonment
for preaching against homosexuality, and the rector of a seminary who ref-
uses admission to a homosexual student could face three to five years."' 01
Recently, the archbishop of Mexico City, Cardinal Norberto Rivera Car-
rera, was investigated by the Mexican Ministry of Internal Affairs regard-
ing charges that he violated the country's laws on religious expression by
speaking out against the legalization of abortion.0 2
The Canadian Human Rights Commission, a quasi-judicial body with a
mandate to investigate "hate speech," is pursuing a complaint against a
web page that is popular with pro-life activists. 0 3 Calgary Bishop Fred
99. Those Danish Cartoons, supra note 9.
100. A bill currently making its way through Congress is The Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007). The Christian Anti-Defamation Com-
mission has dubbed this "The Anti-Christian Bill" because it could be used against preachers who
condemn homosexual acts and other matters they deem to be immoral. See Anti-Christian Bill, supra
note 88.
101. Zenit News, "Homophobia Law" Could Affect Homilies, Seminaries, THE WANDERER, Aug.
23, 2007, at 12, available at http://www.zenit.org/article-19180?l=english.
102. Catholic News Service, Mexican Government Clears Cardinal of Violating the Law by Speak-
ing Out Against Abortion, June 12, 2007, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=9603.
103. Canadian Government Threatens Web Site Popular With Canadian Pro-Lifers, THE
WANDERER, Aug. 9, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.cathohcexchange.com2007/07/28/94571/. The
complaint stems from comments posted to the board by controversial Christian activist Bill Whatcott.
"I can't figure out why the homosexuals I ran into are on the side of the Muslim," Whatcott wrote.
"After all, Muslims who practice Sharia law tend to advocate beheading homosexuals." Whatcott also
wrote on another occasion: "I defy Islamic censorship and speak about what I believe is the truth about
violent Islamism and its threat to religious liberty in Canada." Id.
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Henry was already brought before the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal af-
ter comparing homosexuality to prostitution in a letter he wrote to Cal-
gary's Catholic community." 4 Similarly, Cardinal George Pell, Archbishop
of Sydney, was recently cleared of contempt of Parliament. He had been
referred to the Upper House Privileges Committee in June 2007 after he
remarked that Catholic politicians voting for the Human Cloning Bill
would face consequences for their votes.10 5 Upon being cleared of the
charges, the archbishop released a statement saying,
Along with other citizens I enjoy the right to comment on proposed
laws on my own behalf and on behalf of the community I represent. That is
the essence of democracy. Therefore it seems to me to be an extraordinary
step for the Legislative Council to require a citizen to justify his contribu-
tion to the debate or risk a finding of contempt. °6
V. FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRATIC ACTION
A friend of mine, a law professor named Russ Weaver from the Uni-
versity of Louisville, has traveled all over Europe debating the American
concept of free speech as opposed to the more restrictive European con-
cept. Recently, I watched him debate a Canadian, and the audience
seemed to be on the Canadian side. Russ's conclusion, however, is cer-
tainly worth serious consideration: Without free expression, Democracy
cannot survive.
Democracy depends on full and honest debate. Unfortunately, the
very nature of Democracy creates the desire among some political actors to
stifle opposing voices or at least control the debate. This desire often
manifests itself in legal restrictions on speech. Two of the currently-de-
bated laws that impact free speech are the "fairness doctrine" and the Mc-
Cain-Feingold finance reform law.
104. THE WANDERER, supra note 101, at 9.
105. He had also described legislation overturning a ban on therapeutic cloning as grotesque,
saying it would legalize the creation of human-animal hybrids. The Australian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (ABC.net), Pell welcomes contempt clearing, Sept. 21, 2007, http://abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/
21/2039920.htm?section=justin.
106. Cardinal Pell's Response to Parliamentary Inquiry: "I Enjoy the Right to Comment on Pro-
posed Laws", Zenit. Org, Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.cityes.org/cardinal-pell-s-response-to-
parliamentary-inquiry.html. He also took the opportunity to re-assert his opposition to the legislation:
Parliamentarians who legislate for the destruction of human life (in any circumstances and
especially in this case where no cures from human embryos have been effected during many
years of research) are acting in a way that departs from the principles of both the natural law
known through human reason alone and Christian teaching. The natural law principles and the
teaching in question are that human life should be accorded the full protection of the law
without regard to race, ethnicity, sex, religion, age, condition of dependency or stage of
development.
Id. (citing Robert P. George, Political Obligations, Moral Conscience, and Human Life, VOICEs 22:2 15
(Pentecost 2007).
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A. The Fairness Doctrine
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") originally enacted
the Fairness Doctrine in 1949 to ensure the "right of the public to be in-
formed" by presenting "for acceptance or rejection the different attitudes
and viewpoints" on controversial issues.1" 7 The policy was upheld in 1969
by the Supreme Court because the public airwaves were a "scarce re-
source" that needed to be open to opposing views. 10 8 Unfortunately, it did
not work that way.
In a 1985 report, the FCC concluded the Fairness Doctrine inhibited
broadcasters from dealing with controversial issues and was no longer
needed because of the growth of cable television.10 9 Dennis Patrick, who
was chairman of the FCC in 1987, explained: "Many, many broadcasters
testified they avoided issues they thought would involve them in complaint-
sFalse The commission concluded that the doctrine was having a chilling
effect."11 Accordingly, in 1987 the FCC ended the Fairness Doctrine.111
This move has been credited with triggering the explosive growth of politi-
cal talk radio." 2 Recently, however, after talk shows helped defeat an im-
portant immigration bill that was supported by leaders of both parties,
some in Congress have suggested reinstating the Fairness Doctrine.
13
The Fairness Doctrine would, of course, mandate certain content. If a
show featured one side of a political debate, it would also have to show the
other side. Many good programs already do this. If it is a legal require-
ment, however, we have a problem.
1 1 4
107. Jim Puzzanghera, Some in Congress pushing for reinstatement of Fairness Doctrine, LA
TIMES, July 23, 2007.
108. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
109. Jim Puzzanghera, Some in Congress Pushing for Reinstatement of Fairness Doctrine, LA
TIMES, July 23, 2007, available at http://www.c3.ucla.edu/newsstand/media/a-push-for-reinstatement-of-
the-fairness-doctrine/.
110. Id.
111. The decision was controversial. Congress passed a law in 1987 reinstating the Fairness Doc-
trine, but President Reagan vetoed it. Id.
112. "A 1997 study in the Journal of Legal Studies found that the percentage of AM radio stations
with a news, talk or public affairs format jumped to 28% in 1995 from 7% in 1987." Id.
113. Mississippi's Senator Trent Lott lamented the undue influence of conservative talk radio in
opposing the Senate's immigration legislation. "These are public airwaves and the public should be
entitled to a fair presentation," said Senate Majority Leader Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.). Id.
114. The ACLU has correctly noted that the federal government may not make the awarding of a
broadcast license contingent on the surrender of one's First Amendment, or any other, constitutional
rights. Ron Weich, Interested Persons Memo on Franks/Pickering Amendment on Internet Filtering,
http://www.aclu.org/Cyber-Liberties/Cyber-Liberties.cfm?ID=8972&c=55. Asked about expanding the
Fairness Doctrine to other media, the president of the ACLU replied:
We have historically supported the Fairness Doctrine, although I've dissented from that posi-
tion, as have other prominent people within the ACLU. Our basis for supporting it was so
narrow and so historically contingent that I really have my doubts as to whether even the
Fairness Doctrine itself would be reaffirmed if the ACLU National Board took another look
at it. It was based on the notions of spectrum scarcity and of government having conveyed a
public trust, if you will, to the broadcasters. Both facts have changed substantially. We have
never taken that position with respect to any other media and certainly have never taken it
with respect to print media.
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If an issue has multiple sides, it could become too confusing to even
venture into the subject. An openly political network, like Air America,
would be entirely impractical. The Fairness Doctrine would likely make
station owners so fearful of balancing viewpoints that many of them would
avoid airing controversial topics altogether. In other words, it would chill
debate. That is exactly what happened with the last incarnation of the Fair-
ness Doctrine. Michael Harrison, who hosted a weekend radio talk show in
Los Angeles from 1975 to 1985, said the policy kept him from giving his
opinions on controversial topics. "I would never say that liberals were
good and conservatives were bad, or vice versa. We would talk about, 'Hey,
all politicians are bad,' or 'It's a shame that more people don't vote,"' said
Harrison. "It was more of a superficial approach to politics."' 15 As the
president of the National Association of Broadcasters has written: "Free
speech must be just that - free from government influence, interference
and censorship." ' 6
B. McCain-Feingold
Another content threat to our political speech is The Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act, more commonly known as McCain-Feingold.1 7 This
federal law regulates the financing of political campaigns. It prohibits na-
tional political party committees from raising or spending money (even on
state races) that is not subject to federal limits and restricts broadcast ad-
vertisements shortly before an election, even when when the ad is paid for
by a non-profit organization.118
Years ago, I represented a Senatorial candidate from Louisiana.'1 9 He
was new to politics, so he did not have many supporters. He did, however,
have a few financial backers who were capable of making significant contri-
butions to his campaign. Federal regulations, however, limited what they
were able to contribute. We argued in court that that the applicable regula-
tions restricted the speech of these backers, because in politics money
equals speech. Those restrictions we were facing, however, were not nearly
as restrictive as McCain-Feingold. As one commentator on Mc-
Cain-Feingold explained:
[U]nder the guise of "campaign finance reform," Congress
and the Supreme Court have repealed large parts of the
First Amendment. They have simply discarded what were
Kathy Young, Life, liberty, & the ACLU - American Civil Liberties Union President Nadine Strossen -
Interview, REASON (October 1994), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml568/is_n5_v26/
ai_16101043/pg.l.
115. Puzzanghera, supra note 107.
116. Puzzanghera, supra note 107 (quoting David K. Rehr, president of the National Assn. of
Broadcasters, in a letter to lawmakers).
117. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 and 36 U.S.C.) (known as the McCain-Feingold Act).
118. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), is a case in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
119. Khachaturian, v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 980 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1992).
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once considered constitutional rights of free speech and po-
litical association. It is not that these rights have vanished.
But they are no longer constitutional guarantees. They're
governed by limits and qualifications imposed by Congress,
the courts, state legislatures, regulatory agencies-and law-
yers' interpretations of all of the above.
121
As the ACLU complained: "Without a meaningful First Amendment
exception [to McCain-Feingold], the ACLU could not even broadcast an ad
in the pre-election period asking people to urge their representatives to
restore the right to habeas corpus that Congress eliminated in the Military
Commissions ActFalse.'
12 1
Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently decided a case in which it
recognized that at least portions of the law went too far in terms of restrict-
ing speech. 122 Of course, not all were pleased with the decision. Sen. John
McCain (R.-Ariz.) issued a statement calling the decision "regrettable."
Not only does McCain-Feingold carry his name; it is very favorable to in-
cumbents like him. Laws like this help silence citizens, critics, commenta-
tors, and active opposition. Our concern for free speech, however, is fueled
by the desire to protect the people from the government, not to protect
elected officials from the people.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are many ways to prohibit certain kinds of speech without of-
fending the First Amendment. There are also tempting reasons to do it.
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, in his famous dissent from
the decision in Abrams v. United States, 23 however, free expression is inex-
orably tied to the pursuit for truth.
In the past, totalitarian regimes often recognized the relationship be-
tween free speech and the pursuit of truth. When they suppressed speech,
they justified it by claiming to have the truth. After all, the logic went, if I
am giving you the truth, why would you ever need to raise a "non-true"
contradiction? Those who would suppress speech today sometime make
120. Robert J. Samuelson, So Much for Free Speech, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 25, 2004 at A17.
See also George F. Will, Free Speech Under Siege: In California, 'Progressive' Thinking Has Progressed
to the Idea That Because Money in Politics is Bad, Political Competition Is, Too, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5,
2005.
121. ACLU.org, http://www.aclu.orglscotus/2006term/29169res20070322/29169res20070322.html.
122. In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007),
the Supreme Court disallowed the application of the McCain-Feingold law to a series of television ads
run by Wisconsin Right to Life that called upon Wisconsin citizens to call their Senators (including Sen.
Russ Feingold (D.-Wis.)) about filibustering against judicial nominees. The Court ruled that the organi-
zations engaged in genuine discussion of issues were entitled to a broad, "as applied" exemption from
those portions of McCain-Feingold that limit advertising that names a particular candidate close in time
to an election. Id. at 2674. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts said, "Discussion of issues
cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election. Where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor." Id. at 2669.
123. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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similar claims. Thus, when Harvard President Lawrence H. Summers
dared to suggest that it might be worth studying whether innate differences
between men and women are one reason why fewer women succeed in
science and math careers, he was drummed out of the academy.
124
Other times, modern speech restrictions are justified not by a claim to
the truth. Instead, those who would restrict expression devalue the pursuit
of truth by claiming that there is no truth or that, if it exists, it cannot be
identified. If there is no truth, or if truth can never be discovered, then
there is no reason to elevate the search for truth above other concerns. As
such, speech - the means we use to pursue truth - need not be given special
protection.125 Accordingly, Law Professors J. Peter Byrne of Georgetown
and Kent Greenawalt of Columbia have argued that speech intended to
hurt the listener cannot lead to truth, so it is acceptable to prohibit racial
name-calling. 26 Professor Mari Matsuda, also of Georgetown Law School,
claimed that under principles of academic freedom and free expression,
only academically tenable views need be protected; ignorant speech can be
prohibited without harming the pursuit of truth. 127 Similarly, Cornell law
professor Steven Shiffrin argued that racist speech can be prohibited be-
cause it makes "no contribution to public political dialogue."'
1 28
This generation's suppression of speech is being done for well-in-
tended reasons. Speech regulations, however, cut against the basic Ameri-
can belief in debate and the pursuit of truth. They also hinder education,
thwart Democracy, and put all of our civil liberties at risk. Those who
would bar certain words because they are thought not to contribute to the
search for truth miss the point of debate. The truth of the speech itself is
not the issue. What must be protected is the pursuit of truth, and even false
statements can contribute to that cause. Those who assert unfounded or
unprincipled positions can be challenged and if their arguments do not hold
up, then those arguments - wrong though they were - have contributed to
the pursuit of truth. This is how our society works and how our best
124. Marcella Bombardieri, Summers' Remarks on Women Draw Fire, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
17, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/01/17/sum-
mersremarks_onwomen drawfire/.
125. This argument is often made by those who seek to prohibit racial epithets. Law Professors J.
Peter Byrne of Georgetown and Kent Greenawalt of Columbia, for instance, argue that speech in-
tended to hurt the listener cannot lead to truth, so it is acceptable to prohibit racial name-calling.
Professor Mari Matsuda, also of Georgetown Law School, claims that under principles of academic
freedom and free expression, only academically tenable views need be protected; ignorant speech can
be prohibited without harming the pursuit of truth. Similarly, Cornell law professor Steven Shiffrin
argues that racist speech can be prohibited because it makes "no contribution to public political dia-
logue." The ultimate point made by each of these legal scholars is that speech cannot lead to truth, so
there is no need to give it special protection.
126. Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUrGERS L. REv.
287, 293 (1990); J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399,
400 (1991).
127. Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320 (1989).
128. Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, And The Meaning Of America, 80
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20081
434 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 27:407
universities work. Judge Keady clearly recognized this. Justice Holmes
called it the theory of our Constitution. Few, if any, legal scholars have
been more perceptive.
